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THE ENFORCEMENT OF ICSID AWARDS IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
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ABSTRACT
The People ' Republic of China is one of the most enthusiastic
signatories of bilateral investment treaties that grant mandatory
jurisdiction to the ICSID investment arbitrationsystem. This essay
considers the PRC's domestic laws affecting the fulfillment of its
ICSID Convention obligations to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards. It notes that the PRC has failed to enact any specific
legislation to comply with the ICSID Convention recognition and
enforcement obligations, making its compliance with these
obligations uncertain. It concludes that the only way that the PRC
could claim to have fulfilled its treaty obligations is to declare that
the ICSID Convention and related agreements have direct effect in
its domestic law. The status of treaties within PRC law, however,
remains uncertain and unsettled. For this reason, it is likely that a
judicial interpretationfrom the Supreme People ' Court is necessary
to guarantee enforcement of such an award within the PRC system.
Without such an interpretation,it is highly doubtful that a PRC court
would enforce an ICSID award, despite the ICSID Convention
plain requirement that it do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has had a long history of
jealously guarding its sovereignty against foreign countries and
international tribunals.' In a classic statement of this point of view, PRC
scholar Ying Tao described decisions of international courts or arbitral
organs as made "under [the] manipulation" of "big capitalist powers."2
While the contemporary PRC has recently begun to accept
participation in a few binding international dispute mechanisms, it has
generally been careful to limit the scope of its obligations and the
jurisdiction of such international courts or arbitrations. For example, the
PRC has signed nearly 53 multilateral conventions with binding
international dispute mechanisms and it has chosen to opt out of nearly all
of those mechanisms. 3 To the extent the PRC has agreed to such
mechanisms, it has generally done so only when the treaty itself makes
agreement to binding dispute settlement mandatory.4 Indeed, in a recent
dispute, the PRC has even gone so far as to walk away from its obligation
to arbitrate under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.s
There is, however, one remarkable exception to this general skepticism
toward binding international dispute settlement. The PRC is not only a
party to the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States [hereinafter ICSID Convention], 6 but
it has also been one of the world's most enthusiastic signatories of bilateral
investment treaties that grant binding mandatory jurisdiction to ICSID
arbitration tribunals.
One explanation for this paradox may be that the PRC has assumed
that it would rarely if ever be a respondent in an ICSID proceeding. In the
nearly two decades since joining the ICSID Convention, the PRC has faced
only one arbitration brought by an investor, and that arbitration was
7
suspended before any filings were made. Nor, until recently, have any
See Julian G. Ku, China and the Future of InternationalAdjudication, 27 MD. J. INT'L L. 154
(2012).
2 Ying Tao, Recognize the True Face of Bourgeois InternationalLaw from a Few Basic Concepts,
in PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, 70-71 (J. Cohen & H.
Chiu eds., 1974).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 165-69. (Discussing China's participation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the World Trade Organization Agreement.)
5 The Associated Press, ChinaRejects UN. ArbitrationofMaritime Dispute, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2013, at Al3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/world/asia/china-rejects-unarbitration-of-maritime-dispute.html? r=O.
6 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, openedfor signatureMar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
7 See generally Ekran Berhad v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 1/15 (Date
registered May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Ekran Derhad v. China]. The proceeding was suspended
pursuant to the parties' agreement.
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PRC investors invoked BITs against foreign states. Indeed, the PRC has
not enacted any legislation to fulfill its obligations under the ICSID
Convention to create domestic law mechanisms to recognize and enforce
ICSID awards. 9
There is another possibility. PRC authorities may believe that PRC law
does not need any further changes to implement its ICSID Convention
obligations. Under existing PRC domestic law, treaties like the ICSID
Convention may be interpreted to take priority over conflicting domestic
law. If so, than the ICSID Convention's terms may be considered to have
"direct effect" within the PRC domestic legal system and ICSID awards
would be enforced directly by PRC courts.
This essay considers the PRC's domestic laws affecting the fulfillment
of its ICSID Convention obligations to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards. It begins by discussing the PRC's decision to join ICSID and to
create a large network of bilateral investment treaties. It then notes that the
PRC has failed to enact any specific legislation to comply with the ICSID
Convention's recognition and enforcement obligations. It finally concludes
that the only way that the PRC could claim to have fulfilled its treaty
obligations is to declare that the ICSID Convention and related agreements
have direct effect in its domestic law. The status of treaties within PRC law,
however, remains uncertain and unsettled. For this reason, it is likely that,
at the very least, a judicial interpretation from the Supreme People's Court
is necessary to clarify a series of domestic law objections that would likely
be raised against any attempt to enforce an ICSID award in the PRC.
Without such an interpretation, it is highly doubtful that a PRC court would
enforce an ICSID award, despite the ICSID Convention's plain requirement
that it do so.
II. CHINA AND THE ICSID CONVENTION
The PRC acceded to the ICSID Convention in 1993. The PRC's
accession to ICSID marked one of the first times it had accepted the
possibility of submitting disputes over its sovereign actions to the
jurisdiction of a third-party arbitration system. Historically, the PRC had
treated such international dispute resolution mechanisms with caution or
even hostility. Part of this hostility was due to a perceived pro-Western bias
in such institutions, but another part of the hostility arose from the PRC's
' See generally Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 (Date
registered Feb. 12, 2007); Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An
Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/29 (Date registered Sept. 19, 2012).
9 Xiao Fang, Guo Ji Tou Zi Zhong Cai Cai Jue Zai Zhong Guo De Chen Ren Yu Zhi Xing
[Recognition and Enforcement of InternationalInvestment ArbitrationAward in China], 6 JURISTS
REVIEW 94, 95 (2011).
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emphasis on protecting its sovereign independence.' 0
In addition to joining the ICSID system in 1993 (and entering into
numerous bilateral investment agreements granting jurisdiction to ICSID
tribunals), the PRC also acceded to the jurisdiction of the compulsory
dispute settlement system created by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea in 1996. Finally, in 2001, the PRC accepted the jurisdiction
of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization." Joining
ICSID, therefore, represented an important milestone in the PRC's
engagement with mechanisms of international adjudication.
The PRC's decision to depart from its past practice to join the ICSID
Convention was long urged by PRC scholars. Such academics argued that
joining the ISCID Convention posed a relatively small threat to China's
sovereignty since joining the convention itself does not constitute an
agreement to grant ICSID 1urisdiction. Any consent must be given in a
separate written agreement. Other scholars noted that China could play a
constructive role as a member of ICSID by representing the interests of
developing countries as well as protecting its own interests.1 3 Finally,
scholars believed that the PRC's accession would foster confidence among
foreign investors that their investments would be protectedl4 as well as
provide protection for the increased levels of PRC investment overseas.15
In joining ICSID, however, the PRC limited the scope of its consent to
ICSID's jurisdiction. Upon acceding to the convention, the PRC notified
the Centre that "[P]ursuant to Article 25(4) of the Convention, the Chinese
Government would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of [ICSID]
disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and
nationalization."' The legal effect of this notification, however, does not
mean that the PRC can never broaden the scope of jurisdiction in an ICSID
arbitration. It still permits the PRC to separately consent to a broader set of
disputes in a bilateral investment agreement. Nonetheless, the existence
'o See Julian G. Ku, supra note 1.
I Id. at 160.
12See generally Zhou Chengxin, Dui Wo Guo Ying Fou Jia Ru Jie Jue Tou Zi Zheng Duan Gong
Yue De Yi Dian Yi Jian [Some Opinions on Whether China Should Participatein "Convention on
Settlement ofInvestment Disputes"], 5(1) L. REV. 42 (1987).
13 Id
14 Id. Zhang Qinglin, Yong Jin Dang Di Jiu Ji Yu "Zhong Xin" (ICSID) Guan Xia Quan [The
Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the ISCID "Center" Jurisdiction], 5 SCIENCE OF L. 74, 78
(1991).
15 Zhang Zhiyong, Wo Guo Dui Hai Wai Zhi Jie Tou Zi De Fa Lu [On LegalProtection of Chinese
ForeignDirect Investment], 2 L. Sci. MAG. 14, 14 (1997).
16 ISCID, Contracting States and Measure Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention
(Sept., 2012), http://icsid.worldbank.orgflCSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&action
Val=ShowDocument&Measures=True&language=English.
17 Shen Hong, Lun ICSID Dui Shi Zhong Guo Tou Zi Tiao Yue Zhong CaiDe Guan Xia Quan [On
The Jurisdictionof ICS1D Relating to China's Investment-treaty-basedArbitration], 32(7) L. ScI.
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of this notification reflects the PRC's initially wary approach to the ICSID
system.
A. China and Bilateral Investment Treaties
Under the ICSID system, an investor-state arbitration cannot be
initiated unless the host state has separately consented to such jurisdiction.
Such consent usually takes the form of a bilateral investment treaty with
another nation. As of September 2012, the PRC has signed BITs with 100
States.18 The sheer number of PRC BITs is impressive, especially when
compared to other countries like India (61), the United States (48), and
Japan (11).19
Although the first PRC BIT was signed in 1982 with Sweden,20 most
PRC BITs were signed after the 1993 accession to the ICSID Convention.
Early PRC BITs avoided investor-state arbitration.21 For instance, the first
BIT to include an ICSID arbitration provision was signed with Spain in
1992. Setting a precedent for future PRC BITs, the PRC-Spain BIT limited
investor-state arbitration disputes over the amount of compensation
resulting from expropriation and nationalization. 22 Subsequent BITs
contain a similar limitation on the subject-matter of arbitrations to
questions of the "amount of compensation resulting from expropriation and
nationalization."
B. China and New Generation BITs
Later PRC BITs, however, departed from this practice.23 Since the
conclusion of the 1998 BIT between the PRC and Barbados, most PRC
MAG. 128, 129 (2011); Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation
Investment Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 90
(2007).
8 Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Department of Treaty and Law), Wo
Guo Dui Wai Qian Ding Shuang Bian Tou Zi Xie Ding Yi Lan Biao [The List of Bilateral
Investment Treaty in People's Republic of China] (Nov. 8, 2011), http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/Nocategory/20111/20111107819474.html.
19 ICSID, ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Main (last
visited May 15, 2013).
20 Id.

21 Schill, supra note 17, at 89. Guiguo Wang, Trade, Investment and Dispute Settlement: China's
Practicein InternationalInvestment Law: From Participationto Leadership in the World Economy,
34 YALE J. INT'L L. 575, 584 (2009).
22 Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Spain on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 9, P.R.C.-Spain, Feb. 6, 1992.
23 See Yu Jingsong & Zhan Xiaoning, Lun Tou Zi Zhe Yu Dong Dao Guo Jian Zheng Duan JieJue
Ji Zhi Ji Qi Ying Xiang [On the Dispute Settlement Mechanics Between Investors and Relative
States andIts Influences], 5 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 175, 176-177 (2005).
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BITs have granted ICSID jurisdiction without the limitation on the nature
of the investment dispute. 24 For example, Article 9 of the 2005
PRC-Finland bilateral investment treaty states that "any investment
disputes arising from the investment between contracting parties," may be
submitted to the ICSID for arbitration. 2 5 As a result of the less restrictive
BIT terms, arbitrable investment disputes against the PRC have expanded
to the disputes involving investment treatment, transfer and other issues.26
Such broad clauses thus allow investors not only to resolve disputes
concerning the amount of compensation in expropriation cases, but also to
invoke all substantive rights granted in the applicable BIT.27
Because the PRC usually includes a standard Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment clause in its BITs, it is possible that investors from states
operating under the earlier generation PRC BITs could invoke the more
generous terms of the newer BITs. This issue is complicated by the fact that
PRC BITs contain at least three types of MFN clauses. The first kind of
MFN provision has a broad application, but does not specify whether the
scope of application of the provisions including dispute settlement
matters. 2 8 The second type of MFN clause terms limits its scope but does
not specify whether dispute settlement is outside the scope of the MFN
treatment.29 For example, the PRC Malta BIT provides
[t]hat the investment and investment-related activities treatment a
party gives the other party investors, in its investment
management, terms of use, enjoyment or punishment, should not
be less than its treatment of investment and investment-related
activities given to any third-country investors.3 0
Only the third type of MFN clause clearly excludes its application to
dispute settlement. For instance, the BIT between the PRC and Colombia
states that "provisions of this agreement on the granting of
Most-Favored-Nation status in similar circumstances in the various treaties
or international investment agreements do not apply to investment dispute
settlement mechanisms, such as set forth in article eighth and article ninth
24 Id
25

Id

26 Id.

27 Schill, supra note 17, at 91.
28 Nan Wang, Zui Hui Guo Dai Yu Tiao Kuan Zai Guo Ji Tou Zi Zheng Duan Jie Jue Shi Xiang
Shang Shi Yong Wen Ti [On the Application of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment Clause to
InternationalInvestment Dispute Settlement], I HEBEi L. 120, 121-122 (2010).
29 Id.
30 Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malta on the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, art. 3(3)(1), Feb. 22, 2009.
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of the present Agreement." 3 1
Scholars and arbitrators remain divided on whether the first and second
types of MFN clauses could trigger the dispute settlement clause of the
3
third-party treaty. 32 Some arbitration tribunals have held that they do.33
Some scholars have also endorsed this view, 34 but this view is not
universal. 35 It is thus conceivable, in light of this authority, that investors
from states with earlier generation China BITs could avail themselves of
the investor-state provisions of the new generation BITs.
No matter how the MFN issue is resolved, it is plain that the PRC is
now deeply engaged and intertwined with the ICSID system of investment
protection and investor-state arbitration. But despite the PRC's deep
engagement with ICSID, it has only been subject to one investor-state
proceeding, and that proceeding was suspended shortly after it was filed.37
Indeed, until a recent award involving a Hong Kong resident's claim
against Peru, no PRC BIT has ever been invoked as the basis for
jurisdiction in an ICSID investor-state arbitration. The success of the action
against Peru, however, combined with the sheer volume of PRC BITs, is
likely to trigger more ICSID actions involving the PRC or PRC nationals in
the near future. Indeed, PRC arbitrators have recently begun participating
in ICSID proceedings.38 The U.S. and the PRC have recently re-opened
negotiations on the creation of a US-PRC BIT. 3 9 It is thus worth
considering how and whether the PRC would recognize and enforce an
ICSID award within its domestic legal system.
III. THE PRC's DOMESTIC LAw REGARDING ENFORCEMENT of ICSID
AWARDS
Article 69 of ICSID Convention instructs member states to "take such
31 Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and Colombia on the Promotion
and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 3(3), Nov. 22, 2008.
32 Wang, supra note 28, at 120.
33 Id
34 Schill, supra note 17, at 101. Ko-Yung Tung & Rafael Cox-Alomar, Arbitral & Judicial
Decision: the New Generation of China Bits in Light of 7ZA YAP SHUMv. Republic of Peru, 17
AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 461, 462 (2006).
3s Jie Wang, Investor-State Arbitration: Where Does China Stand, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 493, 500 (2009). In Professor Wang's view, a likely answer would have to be made on a
case-by-case basis by analyzing the specific MFN clause of the particular BIT.
36 Id
37 Ekran Derhad v. China.

38See

Zhuang-Hui

Wu, International Arbitration for Chinese-Foreign Disputes, 41(2)

INTERNATIONAL LAW NEWS 1, 8 (2012).

3 Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky et al., United States to Resume BilateralInvestment Treaty
Negotiations on the Basis of a Revised Model Treaty, WILMERHALE (May 15, 2012),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubld=89748 ("On May
4, 2012 the U.S. and China announced their intention to schedule a 7th round of talks on a BIT.")
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legislative or other measures as may be necessary for making the provisions
of the Convention effective . . ." Such legislative measures include an

obligation to ensure that an ICSID award "shall be binding on the parties
and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy." 4 0
Additionally, the Convention further requires member states to give broad
recognition to awards within their domestic law. As Article 54 states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State.
This provision thus specifies that a member state must provide a
domestic law enforcement mechanism for ICSID awards and that such
mechanism must give awards the status of a "final judgment of a court of
that state." The United States, for instance, has implemented this provision
by a federal statute that gives ICSID awards a status equivalent to that of a
domestic state court judgment.
An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV
of the [ICSID] convention shall create a right arising under a
treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by
such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full
faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction of one of the several States. 4'
While not every country is required to fulfill its Article 54 obligations
in the same way, Article 54 plainly requires the PRC to ensure that ICSID
awards may be enforced in the same manner as domestic court judgments.
A. PRC Domestic Law Governing the Recognition and Enforcement
ofArbitral Awards
There is no domestic PRC legislation that specifically implements
these obligations under the ICSID Convention. However, if a party brought
an ICSID award to the PRC, it would likely invoke Article 269 of the Civil
Procedural Law.
If an award made by a foreign arbitration agency requires the
recognition and enforcement by a people's court of the People's
40
41

ICSID Convention, art. 53.
Foreign Relations and Intercourse, 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2000).
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Republic of China, the party concerned shall directly apply to the
intermediate people's court in the place where the party subject to
execution has its domicile or where its property is located. The
people's court shall deal with the matter in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the international treaties concluded or
acceded to by the People's Republic of China or on the principle
of reciprocity.
A party seeking enforcement would also invoke Article 238 the CPL,
which provides that "if an international treaty concluded or acceded to by
the People's Republic of China contains provisions differing from those
found in this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply,
unless the provisions are the ones on which China has announced
reservations."
On its face, Articles 269 and 238 of the CPL allow parties seeking to
enforce an ICSID award to invoke the ICSID Convention itself. Read in
this light, Article 269 of the CPL makes clear that intermediate people's
courts should treat ICSID awards consistent with the Article 54 of the
ICSID Convention, e.g. as final judgments of domestic courts. Article 238
would then make clear that no other domestic law could override Article 54
of the ICSID Convention's requirements.
This interpretation of the CPL, however, requires the assumption that
PRC law can incorporate treaties to operate directly and even to override
inconsistent domestic law. Some notable PRC scholars, like Tieya Wang,
have argued that the PRC has adopted a system of "adoption" for
international treaties into PRC law.42 Adoption is the direct incorporation
of treaties into PRC domestic law without any separate act of
"transformation" by the governmental authorities. Writing in 1995, Wang
suggested that numerous treaties, involving both civil and criminal matters,
have been directly "adopted" into the Chinese legal system.43
By the end of the 1990s, however, enthusiasm for the Wang's view on
treaty incorporation began to wane. A likely factor in the shift in viewpoint
was China's accession to the WTO. Commentators noticed that the WTO
and its numerous annexes were not directly incorporated by most WTO
states, and Chinese courts (supported by Chinese scholars) eventually
concluded that the WTO agreements should not be "adopted" in China.
Although at least one scholar has argued in favor of rejecting direct
incorporation completely,44 the consensus view seems to maintain the
42Tieya Wang, The Status of Treaties in the Chinese Legal System, 1 J. CHINESE & CoMP. L. 1, 4

(1995).
43 id.

4 Yong-Wei Liu, Guo Ji Tiao Yue Zai Zhong Guo Shi Yong Xin Lun [Some New Thoughts on
Application ofInternationalTreaties in China], 2 JURISTs REv. 143, 144 (2007).
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adoption approach for some treaties. Recent scholarship has repeatedly
called for either constitutional amendments or more legislation to clarify
the status of treaties and confirm that adoption permits direct application of
many international treaties. 45 Hence, while adoption is no longer
necessarily the dominant method of treaty incorporation in the PRC, it
remains a key component of China's existing, and future, mechanisms for
treaty interpretation. This continuing academic discussion reflects the fluid
status of Chinese legal doctrine on the incorporation of treaties.
It is also true, however, that treaties have rarely been directly applied
by Chinese courts unless the relevant PRC legislation specifically mentions
treaties. 46 The unsettled state of doctrine on treaty implementation means
that even provisions such as Articles 269 and 238 do not guarantee that
PRC courts will enforce ICSID awards.
B. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards
This conclusion is supported by the PRC's implementation of the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards.47 Like the ICSID Convention, the recognition and enforcement
provisions of the New York Convention could have been interpreted to
have direct effect in PRC law pursuant to Articles 269 and 238 of the CPL.
Despite those provisions, the New York Convention was not implemented
within the PRC system until the Supreme People's Court issued a judicial
notice to guide lower courts in the enforcement of private arbitral awards
under the Convention.
Article 32 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Organization of the People's Courts provides "Supreme People's Court
shall issue judicial interpretations on specific application of laws and
decrees of the problems for trial."48 The Supreme People's Court has the
authority to issue judicial interpretations on almost any laws applied by
lower PRC courts.
Thus, in 1987, one year after the PRC acceded to the New York
Convention, the Supreme People's Court issued "Circular on the
Implementation on Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of

45 See YONG WANG, TlAo YUE ZAI ZHONG Guo SHI YONG ZHI I BEN Li LUN WEN Ti YAN JIU

[BASIC PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES IN THE APPLICATION OF TREATIES IN CHINA] 171-181 (2007).
Id.

46

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
330 U.N.T.S. 3.
4 Quan Guo Ren Min Dai Biao Da Hui Chang Wu Wei Yuan Hui Guan Yu Jia Qiang Fa Lu Jie
Shi Gong Zuo De Jue Yi [Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law], CLI.1. 1006(EN), art. 32 (1981).

47
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Foreign Arbitral Awards". 49 This judicial interpretation guided lower courts
on a variety of questions related to judicial treatment of foreign arbitration
awards.50 For instance, the circular made clear that domestic courts should
treat the New York Convention as superior to provisions of the Civil
Procedure Law.5 ' It also instructed lower courts on which questions of
jurisdiction over arbitral award enforcement actions. 52 This and other
judicial interpretations were important mechanisms for guiding lower court
actions with private arbitral awards under the New York Convention,
especially since the Civil Procedure Law had no specific provisions
governing the enforcement of arbitral awards at that time. The CPL was
later revised in 1991 to include provisions specifically directed toward
foreign arbitral awards.
In any event, the Supreme People's Court's guidance also extended to
obligations not contained in the letter of the New York Convention. For
example, the "Circular on Questions Concerning the Handling of Foreign
Arbitrations" 53 requires people's courts to report to the jurisdiction of the
subordinate higher people's court concerned for examination before issuing
a decision to refuse to recognize and enforce arbitration under the New
York Convention. If the higher people's court agrees with the lower court's
decision to refuse enforcement, the Supreme People's Court must also be
consulted. The original people's court must await a reply from the Supreme
People's court before refusing to enforce an award.
This pro-enforcement approach might seem to bode well for attempts
to enforce an ICSID award. But it also reflects the importance of guidance
from the Supreme People's Court in managing the enforcement of private
Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Zhi Xing Wo Guo Jia Ru De Cheng Ren Ji Zhi Xing Wai
Guo Zhong Cai Cai Jue Gong Yue De Tong Zhi [Circular on the Implementation on Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards] (Apr. 10, 1987), available at
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgklitem/dwjjflfalv/9/9-1-7-1.html [hereinafter Circular on the
Implementation on Convention].
5o The request for recognition and enforcement of the arbitration award made on the territory of
another contracting state, shall be made by one party against the award is revoked. The request
made by one party shall be governed by the following Intermediate People's Court of People's
Republic of China: if the enforced party is a nature person, the jurisdiction shall be the court of the
place with his/her place of domicile or residence; if the enforced party is a legal entity, the
jurisdiction shall be the court of the place of its main office; if the enforced party has no place of
domicile, residence, or main office but still has property in China, the jurisdiction shall be the court
of the place of property.
1 Circular on the Implementation on Convention, I ("Where there is any conflict between the
provisions of this convention and the provisions of China's Civil Procedure Law (Trial
Implementation), this Convention shall prevail.")
52Circular on the Implementation on Convention, 1 5; Bruce R. Schulberg, China's Accession to
the New York Convention: An Analysis of a New Regime for the Recognition and Enforcement of
ArbitralAwards,3 J. CHINESE L. 117, 135 (1989).
53 Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Chu Li Yu She Wai Zhong Cai Ji Wai
Guo Zhong Cai Shi Qiang You Guan Wen Ti De Tong Zhi [Circular on Questions Concerning the
Handling of Foreign Arbitrations].
49
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arbitral awards. This practice suggests that lower courts in the PRC would
neither enforce, nor refuse to enforce, an ICSID award until the Supreme
People's Court issued a definitive interpretation. No such interpretation has
been issued in the nearly two decades since the PRC's accession to ICSID,
although one PRC scholar has recently called for the SPC to issue such an
interpretation. 54
Such an interpretation could resolve ambiguities about enforcement of
ICSID award in PRC courts. Scholars have noted that an ICSID award
enforcement action would face a number of possible legal defenses that
may or may not comply with Article 54 of ICSID.
For instance, a defending sovereign state might raise the "social and
public policy interest" exception to enforcement contained in Article 217 of
the CPL.55 Under the New York Convention's Article V, arbitration awards
face a "public policy" exception to enforcement that might correspond with
Article 217 of the CPL. However, the ICSID Convention contains no
analogous public policy exception to enforcement. A PRC court that used
Article 217 of the CPL to reject enforcement would likely violate Article
53's prohibition of appeals and Article 54's requirement of "final
judgment" status for ICSID Awards. As the ad hoc Committee in MINE v.
Guinea expressed noted:
4.02 Article 53 of the Convention provides that the award shall be
binding on the parties "and shall not be subject to any appeal or
to any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention". The post-award procedures (remedies) provided for
in the Convention, namely, addition to, and correction of, the
award (Art. 49), and interpretation (Art. 50), revision (Art. 51)
and annulment (Art. 52) of the award are to be exercised within
the framework of the Convention and in accordance with its
provisions. It appears from these provisions that the Convention
excludes any attack on the award in national courts.
Indeed, the course on the ICSID Convention provided by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development specifically rules out any
invocation of "ordre public" or "public policy" in a challenge to ICSID
awards. Instead, courts are limited to "verifying the authenticity of ICSID
Xiao, supra note 9, at 96. The system under ICSID Convention takes the cooperation of the
domestic laws of Contracting State. However, China has no relevant rules or arrangement in its
domestic laws, including that all the relating departments in Supreme People's Court have no idea
about how to recognize and enforce the ICSID arbitration awards.
5 "If the people's court determines that the execution of the arbitral award is against the public
interest, it shall make an order not to allow the execution."
56 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Government of Guinea (Guinea),
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision, $ 4.02 (Date registered Jan. 6, 1988).
54
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Awards."57
In a similar vein, Professor Xiao Fang has argued that PRC provisions
for the supervision of trials might allow the appeal of an ICSID award.
Article 177 of CIViL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA provides
If the president of a people's court at any level finds some
definite error in a legally effective judgment or order of his court
and deems it necessary to have the case retried, he shall refer it to
the judicial committee for discussion and decision. If the
Supreme People's Court finds some definite error in a legally
effective judgment or order of a local people's court at any level,
or if a people's court at a higher level finds some definite error in
a legally effective judgment or order of a people's court at a
lower level, it shall have the power to bring the case up for trial
itself or direct the people's court at a lower level to conduct a
retrial.
Article 178 of Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China
provides "If a party considers that a legally effective judgment or order has
some error, he may apply to the people's court which originally tried the
case or to a people's court at the next higher level for retrial; however,
execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended". These two
articles set forth the procedural framework for trial supervision in PRC
courts.
The trial supervision procedure might be interpreted to apply to ICSID
awards since they might qualify as a "legally effective" judgment. Even the
enforcement proceeding might be deemed a legally effective judgment. But
if the trial supervision procedure was applied to the enforcement of an
ICSID award, this would likely breach Article 53's prohibition on appeals
of ICSID awards.
Finally, although Article 55 of the ICSID Convention specifically
exempts a country's sovereign immunity laws from the Convention's reach,
the PRC does not have any formal legal provision that sets forth the effect
of sovereign immunity in its domestic courts. Indeed, the most authoritative
and recent statement of this view was released by the Standing Committee
of the National's People's Congress in response to a request for guidance
from Hong Kong. In the Interpretation of Paragraph1, Article 13 and
Article 19 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the

5 UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement - International Centrefor Settlement of Investment Dispute 2.9
Binding Force andEnforcement, at 16 (2003), http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add8 en.pdf.

44

6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 31

[2013

National People's Congress,S5 the Standing Committee clarified that the
central government, and not Hong Kong, would determine the question of
sovereign immunity. In this case, the Standing Committee found that
immunity should be granted but it did not clarify when and in what future
circumstances state immunity could be invoked in domestic courts. The
absence of a definitive legal provision on sovereign immunity would create
substantial uncertainty in an ICSID enforcement proceeding given that such
a state is almost always the respondent in such a proceeding.
These questions, the public policy exception, trial supervision
procedure, and sovereign immunity, represent some but not all of the key
issues that would be raised in any ICSID award enforcement effort in the
PRC.
IV. CONCLUSION
The PRC's enthusiasm and interest in the ICSID-BIT system of
investment protection and investor state arbitration has not been matched
by the creation of a clear domestic mechanism for living up to its
obligations under these international agreements. While a reasonable
interpretation of the PRC's civil procedure law seems to allow parties to
directly enforce ICSID awards, past practice suggests that a judicial
interpretation from the Supreme People's Court is necessary to clarify
lower courts' authority to enforce awards.
Understood in this light, the PRC's departure from its past hostility to
international arbitration is more understandable. The PRC has not yet
begun to consider itself a likely target for such investor-state arbitration,
and it has not bothered to adopt legislation or judicial interpretations that
would subject it to domestic award enforcements. The full strength of the
PRC's commitment to investor-state arbitration under ICSID has yet to be
tested. Its paucity of domestic legal mechanisms suggests this commitment
is not particularly deep.

8 Quan Guo Ren Da Chan Wei Hui Guan Yu Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qiang Gang Te
Bie Xing Zheng Qu Ji Ben Fa Di Shi San Tiao Di Yi Kuan He Di Shi Jiu Tiao De Jie Shi [The
explanation of Article 13.1 and 19 of "The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Of The People's Republic Of China" by The National People Congress of the People's Republic
of China].
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